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ABSTRACT 
 
 In this study, we document the effect of food stamp access on adult health care 
utilization. While the Food Stamp Program provides one of the largest safety nets in the United 
States today, the universal nature of the program across geographic areas and over time limits the 
potential for quasi-experimental analysis. To circumvent this, we use variation in documented 
immigrants’ eligibility for food stamps across states and over time due to welfare reform in 1996. 
Our estimates indicate that access to food stamps reduced physician visits. Additionally, we find 
that for single women, food stamps increased the affordability of specialty health care. These 
findings have important implications for cost-benefit analyses of the Food Stamp Program, as 
reductions in health care utilization because of food stamps may offset some of the program’s 
impact on the overall government budget owing to the existence of government-provided health 
insurance programs such as Medicaid. 
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 The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), previously named the Food 
Stamp Program, is one of the largest safety net programs in the United States.1 Over 43 million 
individuals, approximately 13 percent of the U.S. population, received benefits from the program 
in 2016, at a cost of roughly $70 billion (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2017). However, the 
program has an uncertain future. For example, the 2017 executive budget proposed cutting 
federal spending on the program by $190 billion over 10 years, through a mix of stricter 
eligibility requirements and shifting the costs of the program to state-level expenditures (Office 
of Management and Budget 2017).2 Moreover, immigrants’ access to food stamps is currently 
being debated under the “public charge” rule (Parrott, Gonzales, and Schott 2018). If a federal 
policy objective is to reduce eligibility for food stamps with the goal of lowering federal 
spending, then the impact of program eligibility on participants’ health care utilization is vital to 
cost-benefit analysis. Consider the possibility that food stamp eligibility may have effects on 
participants that lower their health care utilization. If this was the case, then tightening eligibility 
requirements could cause costs to rise in other safety net programs, such as Medicaid, 
undermining the government’s cost savings from limiting the Food Stamp Program. In this 
study, we ask if such a relationship exists. Specifically, does food stamp eligibility have an 
impact on adult health care utilization?3  
                                                 
1 We use the name food stamps throughout, as this was the name of the program at the time period of our 
study. 
2 Several proposals for the 2018 Farm Bill have also sought to limit spending under the Food Stamp 
Program via work requirements; this policy debate is not yet resolved. 
3 There are several papers that touch on this topic through the Food Stamp Program’s impact on children: 
East (2017a) finds that childhood access to food stamps improves health outcomes contemporaneously and in the 
short to medium run. Hoynes, Schanzenbach, and Almond (2016) find that childhood access to food stamps during 
the initial rollout of the program in the 1960s–1970s improved health outcomes in adulthood such as height and the 
prevalence of metabolic illnesses. Meyerhoefer and Pylypchuk (2008) estimate the impact of food stamps on 
medical expenditures and find increased expenditure levels using a structural model with instrumental variables. 
Finally, Berkowitz et al. (2017) and Samuel et al. (2018) document that food stamp participation is negatively 
correlated with adult health care utilization. 
2 
Adults are the largest group of food stamp benefit recipients, accounting for 51 percent of 
all recipients (Hoynes and Schanzenbach 2015). As such, any effects of food stamps on adult 
health care utilization could have a large impact in terms of dollars spent on health care in the 
immediate to short run, because adults have far greater health care expenditures per capita than 
children do, once children are out of early childhood. To illustrate, in 2013, the United States 
spent $1,600 per capita on health care for female children aged 5–9, as opposed to $7,200 per 
capita on health care for female adults aged 45–49 (Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 
2017).4 
In this study, we estimate the contemporaneous impact of food stamp eligibility on adult 
health care utilization by taking advantage of changing eligibility rules due to the 1996 Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which created plausibly 
exogenous variation in food stamp eligibility for immigrant populations. PRWORA made most 
documented noncitizen immigrants ineligible for food stamps, an action that was gradually 
reversed by state and federal laws in the period between 1998 and 2003.5 Previous work has 
shown that these policy changes had a large effect on food stamp participation and the benefit 
amount received (e.g., Borjas 2004; East 2018b). Using an empirical strategy similar to studies 
by East (2018a,b), we take advantage of differing eligibility criteria across states and over time 
and verify using the Current Population Survey that there were large effects on food stamp 
receipt among immigrant adults. We then extend the analysis using data from the National 
Health Interview Survey to estimate the impact of a single year of eligibility on adults’ health 
care utilization and related outcomes. This requires us to limit our analysis population to 
                                                 
4 For males, the per capita expenditures on health care were $1,900 for children aged 5–9, and $5,500 for 
adults aged 45–49. 
5 Undocumented immigrants were never eligible for food stamps and were therefore unaffected by these 
changes. 
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immigrants, which may limit the generalizability of our findings to the full population and causes 
us to have relatively small sample sizes that reduce the precision of our estimates. However, 
immigrants are a large and policy-relevant subpopulation—10 percent of food stamp participants 
prior to PRWORA were foreign born (East 2018b)—so we view this as a worthwhile trade-off to 
make in order to exploit quasi-experimental variation in food stamps, which has been 
challenging when studying the modern program. 
 We find that one year of eligibility decreases the likelihood of multiple physician office 
visits within a year among low-educated immigrants, and there is a negative and imprecisely 
estimated effect on the likelihood of any physician office visits. We find similarly suggestive 
negative effects on other measures of health care utilization—emergency room visits and 
hospitalizations. We also find evidence that for single low-educated women food stamps may 
reduce the likelihood of not utilizing specialty medical care because of cost. We examine 
whether these results could be driven by changes in health outcomes, and we find no consistent 
evidence that food stamps improve self-reported health. We also find no evidence that the 
population driving our results is those with common chronic conditions such as heart disease, 
hypertension or diabetes, and the subsamples with these chronic conditions are small. Our results 
are therefore suggestive of food stamps reducing the need for repeated primary care among the 
relatively healthy. This might operate through improved nutrition and ability to weather common 
illnesses, such as the flu, without seeking medical attention. The estimated effects imply that 
government spending on health care may have been significantly impacted by PRWORA. At the 
time food stamp eligibility was restored to most immigrants, 43 percent of adult immigrants who 
4 
received food stamp benefits were also covered by the Medicaid program, so a reduction in 
physician visits could decrease Medicaid expenditures for this population.6  
FOOD STAMP ELIGIBILITY AND HEALTH CARE UTILIZATION 
 Eligibility for food stamps may influence adult health care utilization in several ways. 
The simplest is via income: though food stamps are an in-kind transfer, individuals who receive 
the benefit could substitute dollars that would have been spent on food to other purposes. 
Medical care is a normal good, and as such, a positive income shock would be expected to 
increase utilization of care.7 The support for additional consumption of medical care via an 
income effect as a mechanism is somewhat mixed, however; some studies find that food stamps 
are treated similar to a pure cash transfer (Bruich 2014; Currie 2003; Hoynes, McGranahan, and 
Schanzenbach 2015; Hoynes and Schanzenbach 2009; Moffitt 1989). On the other hand, Beatty 
and Tuttle (2014) and Hastings and Shapiro (2018) find that food stamps may cause individuals 
to consume more food than they would have if given an equivalent cash transfer, which would 
dampen any income effects on health care utilization.8  
 Food stamps could also have an impact on adult health care utilization through changes in 
individual health. However, their impact on health would need to be relatively immediate for this 
to have a contemporaneous impact on health care utilization. For example, changes in nutrition 
                                                 
6 Author’s calculations using the 2004–2007 Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current 
Population Survey. We note that the effects on affordability of specialty care for women suggest that women may 
have increased the use of specialty care. However, we do not observe utilization of specialty care and thus are 
unable to test this directly. Therefore, for women in particular, the effect on Medicaid expenditures may be 
ambiguous.  
7 See Newhouse (1992) for a review of estimates of income elasticities of demand for medical care, or 
Baltagi et al. (2017) for a more recent estimate. 
8 There is a separate and large literature looking at the effect of conditional cash transfer programs (such as 
Bolsa Família in Brazil) impact household consumption of health services. The general finding across multiple 
countries is of conditional cash transfers increasing health service utilization. See Fiszbein et al. (2009) for a review. 
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may affect body weight, and some studies find that food stamp eligibility increases the likelihood 
of obesity.9 Much of this evidence, though, estimates the effect of past receipt on current obesity, 
measuring the impact of prolonged food stamp receipt rather than the contemporaneous effect of 
the program. Moreover, the study utilizing methods closest to our own finds no immediate 
impact of immigrants’ food stamp eligibility on their body mass index (BMI) (Kaushal 2007).10 
This is not surprising for the reason previously described: if food stamps change BMI through a 
change in nutrition, such a change would take time before it shows up via health outcomes such 
as BMI, and perhaps even longer before it subsequently affects health care utilization. 
 There are still, however, possible pathways for food stamps to affect health care 
utilization via health of the recipient with immediacy. For example, it is possible that mental 
health is more quickly changed than physical health in response to a change in household 
resources (Evans and Garthwaite 2014), and changes in mental health may have immediate 
health care needs, such as suicide prevention counseling. It is also possible that sudden income 
increases could induce risky behaviors that immediately affect individual health, such as illicit 
drug use, which can immediately increase health care utilization via overdose. Pollack and 
Reuter (2006) find that substance use is higher among benefit recipients than in the general 
population, and several findings suggest mortality may increase shortly after the receipt of 
income, in part due to increases in drug use (e.g., Dobkin and Puller 2007; Evans and Moore 
2012). To explore these possibilities, we will examine physical and mental health metrics. 
                                                 
9 Several studies find that food stamps increase the likelihood of obesity with varying magnitudes of effect 
(Baum 2011; Chen, Yen, and Eastwood 2005; Gibson 2003, 2006; Meyerhofer and Pylypchuck 2008; Townsend et 
al. 2001).  
10 We also investigate whether the same is true in our sample period described below, which is slightly 
different from that in Kaushal (2007) and thus uses slightly different policy variation. Our paper builds on Kaushal’s 
findings by analyzing a longer time frame and a wider range of outcome variables.  
6 
 The final possibility is that food stamps have a direct impact on health care needs because 
of increased food consumption and a reduction in the likelihood of a household being food 
insecure. Food stamps have been shown to both increase consumption of food and decrease food 
insecurity (see, for example, Ratcliffe, McKernan, and Zhang (2011) and Wilde and Nord 
(2005). See also reviews by Gregory, Rabbitt, and Ribar [2015] and Hoynes and Schanzenbach 
[2015]). Particularly relevant for our paper, Borjas (2004) documents that food insecurity 
increased after welfare reform for immigrants relative to natives, and attributes this to welfare-
reform-induced reductions in safety net program participation among immigrants. Food 
insecurity has been identified in the medical and public health literatures as a predictor of 
increased health care utilization.11 Most directly related to our hypothesis is a study by Seligman 
et al. (2014) of hospital admissions in California. They show that admissions for hypoglycemia 
increased noticeably for likely low-income individuals at the end of the month, when food stamp 
benefits (which are allocated monthly, often at the beginning of the month) are more likely to 
have run out. The same pattern did not occur for likely high-income individuals.12 
PRWORA AND FOOD STAMP ELIGIBILITY 
 The enactment of PRWORA in 1996 changed the federal food stamp eligibility criteria to 
exclude most documented noncitizen immigrants. States, however, were given the option to fund 
benefits for the newly federally ineligible populations. Nine states took this option prior to 2002, 
filling the benefit gap back in for the federally ineligible. These “fill-in” states were California, 
                                                 
11 See, for example, work by Cook et al. (2004); Nelson, Brown, and Lurie (1998); and Weiser et al. 
(2013). For a more extensive literature review of food insecurity and health, see Gundersen and Ziliak (2015). 
12 Other studies find results supporting reductions in health care utilization on the days of benefit receipt. 
Cotti, Gordanier, and Ozturk (2016) find reductions in drunk driving fatalities, and Cotti, Gordanier, and Ozturk 
(2018) find reductions in emergency room utilization around the time of benefit receipt. 
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Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Rhode Island, Washington, and 
Wisconsin. We will refer to the other 41 states and the District of Columbia as “no-fill-in” 
states.13 Later, the 2002 Farm Bill restored federal eligibility to three groups of noncitizen 
immigrants: the disabled, children, and those who had lived in the United States for at least five 
years.14 We show a timeline of the relevant changes to immigrant eligibility in Figure 1.  
 Loss of eligibility for noncitizen adults in a household did not necessarily cause 
households to lose all food stamp benefits. U.S.-born children of noncitizen parents have U.S. 
citizenship and thus remain eligible for the program, even when their foreign-born parents lose 
eligibility. Moreover, all foreign-born children were made eligible as part of the Agriculture, 
Research Extension, and Education Reform Act in 1998. As resources within a household can be 
redistributed amongst its members, loss of individual eligibility is not necessarily equivalent to a 
loss of access to all food stamp benefits. However, when the number of eligible members in the 
household falls, the benefit amount that can be shared within the household also falls. For 
example, for a household of three, with one citizen child and two ineligible immigrant parents, 
benefits could have fallen by almost 66 percent ($2,400 annually in 1998). This decrease in the 
benefit amount for households with children was large, so in practice these households may have 
behaved as if they had lost eligibility entirely and stopped participating all together if the small 
benefit amounts no longer outweighed the costs of participating (Daponte, Sanders, and Taylor 
1999). Existing evidence indicates this may have been the case (Van Hook and Balistreri 2006), 
so, to simplify the analysis to follow, we focus on the eligibility of adults in the household and 
                                                 
13 Even though some of the no-fill-in states did restore benefits to some extent, they often did so with 
significant additional strings attached. For example, some states required that immigrants apply for citizenship after 
receiving food stamp benefits, and we do not consider these states to be fill-in states. We define the presence of a 
fill-in program based on information from the USDA SNAP Policy Database, the California Department of Social 
Services, and Bitler and Hoynes (2013). 
14 This discussion is drawn primarily from Bitler and Hoynes (2013), Capps (2004), and Zimmermann and 
Tumlin (1999). 
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do not differentiate between households with and without children or based on the country of 
birth of children. 
 There were several groups of noncitizen immigrants who were unaffected by the changes 
in eligibility criteria contained in PRWORA. Immigrants who had worked in the United States 
for 40 quarters and met minimum earnings requirements in each quarter, those who had served in 
the military, or those who were refugees, asylees, or naturalized citizens remained eligible.15 We 
define our primary sample of interest as those who were born outside the United States and U.S. 
territories, and who report coming to the United States “to stay” less than 15 years but more than 
5 years before the survey. We call this group “treated immigrants.” These restrictions on year of 
entry are intended to capture the group of immigrants likely to be affected by the changes in food 
stamp eligibility, as they have lived in the United States long enough to qualify for the Farm Bill 
restoration, but not long enough to qualify via the 40 quarters of work exemption or by gaining 
citizenship.16 
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 To identify the effect of food stamp eligibility on food stamp benefit receipt, health care 
utilization, and related outcomes, we estimate the following equation:  
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑇. 𝐼. 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑠𝑡 +  𝛾1𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑍𝑠𝑡 + 𝜈𝑠 +  𝜆𝑡 +  𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡    (1) 
 
                                                 
15 Holders of temporary visas and undocumented immigrants were not eligible pre-PRWORA and remained 
ineligible post-PRWORA. Immigrants who entered the United States after the passage of PRWORA in 1996 were 
subject to restrictions on eligibility for Medicaid/SCHIP, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF, formerly Aid to Families with Dependent Child) for at least their first five 
years of U.S. residence (unless their state of residence provided these benefits with state funds). 
16 This also excludes immigrants who, because of PRWORA, would not qualify for other government 
assistance, such as Medicaid, because they have not lived in the United States for five years. 
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where 𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the relevant outcome for individual i living in state s and observed in time t. The 
variable 𝑇. 𝐼. 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑠𝑡 indicates the fraction of the 12 months prior to the month of the survey that 
treated immigrants are eligible for food stamps. Therefore, β indicates the effect of having a full 
year of eligibility on the outcome of interest. We do not condition on participation in the Food 
Stamp Program, so β captures the intent to treat effect.  
 We remove the effect of time invariant state characteristics by including a vector of state 
fixed effects, 𝜈𝑠, and remove the effect of common national-level shocks over time with 𝜆𝑡, 
which is a vector of survey year and calendar quarter fixed effects to remove any seasonal effects 
(such as flu season).17 We also include 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡, a vector of individual controls for gender, age, 
race/ethnicity, year of entry to the United States, number of children under age 5, number of 
children, number of children born outside the United States, educational attainment, and marital 
status. 𝑍𝑠𝑡 is a vector of state by year controls for the state unemployment rate, state 
Medicaid/SCHIP program generosity, whether the state had implemented an electronic benefit 
transfer (EBT) program for food stamps, and state food stamp outreach spending.18 We cluster 
our standard errors by the state of residence and weight using the NHIS and CPS-provided 
survey weights to account for nonrandom sampling.  
 The identifying assumption in this model is that there are no other changes occurring 
across states and over time that are correlated with the food stamp eligibility criteria changes and 
that affect our outcomes of interest as well. East (2018a) finds no evidence that state fixed 
                                                 
17 The CPS data are only available annually, so we omit the calendar quarter controls when using those 
data.  
18 Specifically, we control for the state by year eligibility thresholds (expressed as a fraction of the federal 
poverty line) for infants, children aged 6, and children aged 16 since this was a period of rapid expansion in 
childhood eligibility for these programs. In robustness checks below, we also include controls for adult Medicaid 
eligibility thresholds. We do not control for features of the WIC program as it does not vary over this time period, 
and as such the program’s effect is differenced out of our analysis. 
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demographic or political characteristics predict a fill-in program; however, these characteristics 
are absorbed by the state fixed effects. More importantly, East (2018a) also documents the 
presence of a fill-in program is not correlated with changes in state’s economic conditions or 
safety net generosity over time. 
DATA 
 We draw most of our analysis data from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) to 
provide information regarding health care and related outcomes. We use survey years 1998–
2007, which span the period of restoration of food stamp eligibility for most immigrants.19 The 
survey covers roughly 35,000 households annually and is nationally representative. 
Demographics and some health information are collected for every individual in the household; 
these data are contained in the “Person File.” The NHIS also chooses an adult at random from 
each household and asks additional detailed questions about their health and health care; these 
data are contained in the “Sample Adult File.” We use outcomes from both files; outcomes 
obtained from the Sample Adult File have smaller sample sizes.  
Importantly, the NHIS collects information on the country of birth and year of entry for 
every foreign-born, which we use to construct our measure of “treated immigrants” and potential 
controls groups. There are, however, several measurement issues with reported year of entry to 
the United States; therefore, this year of entry restriction should be interpreted as only a rough 
proxy for those likely to have experienced food stamp eligibility changes.20 Our primary sample 
                                                 
19 The survey format of the NHIS changes prior to 1998, so we restrict the sample to begin in 1998. 
20 Year of entry information is based off a question about when foreign-born individuals came to the United 
States “to stay,” and previous research has documented that for only about 50 percent of respondents does the year 
they report they came to the United States “to stay” coincide with year that they became legal permanent residents, 
the latter of which is the relevant year for determining food stamp eligibility (U.S. Department of Agriculture Food 
and Nutrition Service 2011). Often, this reported year of entry coincides instead with the date of either their first or 
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is adult heads of household and their spouses, for whom the head of household (male if present, 
otherwise female) has a high school education or less. This low-educated group is more likely to 
be affected by food stamp policy changes because, prior to welfare reform, they participated in 
the program at very high rates (East 2018b).21 We follow the food stamp policy definition of 
“adults” and keep individuals aged 18–59 in our sample. If the head of household is married, we 
restrict both spouses to be treated immigrants. Later, we also use U.S.-born adults as a control 
group in alternative analyses. 
To measure health care utilization, we include a measure of whether each adult within the 
past year had any physician office visits, any ER visits, or any overnight hospitalizations. The 
number of physician office visits is coded as a categorical variable in the NHIS; so, to capture 
intensive margin changes in utilization, we also create a binary variable indicating whether the 
individual had two or more physician office visits in the past year. We also include measures of 
whether medical care and four types of specialty health care—mental care, dental care, glasses, 
or prescription medicines—were needed but not received because of cost. To avoid issues of 
multiple hypothesis testing, we create a summary index that captures the four types of specialty 
care affordability (Anderson 2008). The index is constructed as a weighted sum of z-scores of 
the component outcome variables. To create the z-scores of each outcome variable, we calculate 
the mean and standard deviation for each outcome among treated immigrants living in no-fill-in 
states before 2002 (who were not eligible for food stamps). The weights are constructed using 
the inverse of the group of outcomes’ variance-covariance matrix. This method makes efficient 
                                                 
most recent spell of time spent in the United States. For more information on these measurement issues, see 
Redstone and Massey (2004) and Lubotsky (2007). We assume that there are no systematic changes in this 
measurement error that are correlated with food stamp eligibility.  
21 We stratify by educational attainment rather than income because income is endogenous to food stamp 
availability because of labor supply responses (East 2018b).  
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use of the information within the measures, as outcomes that are highly correlated are given a 
lower weight. We then subtract each outcome’s mean and divide by its standard deviation. 
To capture health outcomes, we use self-reported measures of overall health, as well as 
mental health and obesity/overweight status. The measure of overall health is on a scale of 1 to 5, 
with 1 denoting excellent health and 5 denoting poor health. While this is a subjective measure, 
self-reported health is a good predictor of mortality (DeSalvo et al. 2006; Idler and Benyamini 
1997). We also create a binary variable to ease interpretation, which takes on a value of one if 
the individual reports to be in very good or excellent health. There are six mental health 
questions, so we create a summary index of the corresponding six variables, similar to the one 
described above for affordability. These six questions ask how often, in the past 30 days, the 
individual has felt sad, nervous, restless or fidgety, hopeless, hat everything was an effort, or 
worthless. 
 State of residence is only available in the restricted-use version of the NHIS, so we access 
this through permission from the National Center for Health Statistics. We use state of residence 
to merge in food stamp policy rules and state-year level control variables, including the state 
unemployment rate and generosity of other safety net programs. These control variables and data 
sources are described in more detail in the appendix. Since most outcome variables are annual 
measures, we model Food Stamp eligibility as the fraction of the 12 months prior to the survey 
month that the household would have been eligible for food stamps, based on their state of 
residence of year/month of observation. Table 1 provides summary statistics for the key 
demographic characteristics that we draw from the NHIS.  
 We use additional data from the March Current Population Survey (CPS) for 1998–2007 
(Flood et al. 2015). We use the same demographic and geographic variables as the NHIS to 
13 
construct our sample and focus on two outcomes of interest: a binary variable for food stamp 
receipt in the past year and the annual dollar value of the food stamp benefits received. This 
information of food stamp receipt is collected at the household level, so we cannot distinguish 
which household members received the benefits.  
We use the NHIS and CPS-provided weights throughout to account for survey 
oversampling and nonrandom nonresponse (Flood et al. 2015; National Center for Health 
Statistics 2005). 
RESULTS 
Program Participation 
 Before examining the effect of eligibility on health care utilization, we demonstrate that 
eligibility indeed influenced program participation for treated immigrants. Table 2 reports 
estimation results for Equation (1) using the variables taken from the CPS. Panel A shows the 
results for the full sample of all low-educated adults, and Panel B shows the results only for low-
educated single women, who participated in food stamps at double the rates of all low-educated 
adults (12 percent vs. 24 percent). A full year of food stamp eligibility increases the likelihood of 
receiving food stamps by 4.4 percentage points and increases the average annual benefit received 
by approximately $86 for treated immigrant adults with high school education or less.22 The 
point estimates roughly double when the sample is further restricted to single women with high 
school education or less, although the average rates of participation among this group are also 
                                                 
22 It is important to note that food stamp receipt is underreported in the Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement (Meyer, Mok, and Sullivan 2009). If the underreporting is random, measurement error will result in an 
underestimate of the effect on program take-up. So, we view these estimated effects as likely lower bounds and 
therefore do not use these to calculate treatment on the treated effects, since these effects would be overestimated 
(Stephens and Unayama 2015). 
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roughly double the full low-educated sample. These results correspond with findings from East 
(2018b), who shows that eligibility caused low-educated immigrants to participate in food 
stamps at higher rates.23 
Utilization 
We next examine how access to food stamps affects health care utilization in Table 3. 
Again, Panel A shows the results for the full sample of all low-educated adults, and Panel B 
shows the results only for low-educated single women. A full year of food stamp eligibility does 
not affect the likelihood of having any office visits in the previous year that is significant at 
conventional levels (column 1). However, the point estimate is negative for both all adults and 
single women, with the latter result having a point estimate that is quite large relative to the mean 
(a 23 percent reduction), providing some weakly suggestive evidence that for single women, 
food stamp eligibility may reduce the need for any physician care. Column 2 demonstrates that a 
full year of food stamp eligibility does cause a statistically significant decline in the likelihood of 
going to more than one office visit in the past year of 14 percentage points for all adults and 20 
percentage points for single women (both estimates have p<0.01). This provides strong evidence 
that food stamps reduce the amount of care consumed, conditional on using some care. (This is 
reinforced by a strong estimated impact of eligibility on the likelihood of multiple office visits 
conditional on any visits—a direct estimate of the response on the intensive margin—shown in 
column 4.) The results on the intensive margin have the same direction as responses on the 
                                                 
23 We are using a slightly different sample than East (2018b) in terms of survey years and sample 
restrictions based on demographic characteristics. However, the results are similar: East (2018b) finds declines in 
food stamp participation of 1–8 percentage points. East (2018b) furthermore shows that eligibility caused married 
immigrant men to move from full-time to part-time work and single women to drop out of the labor force. 
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intensive margin for outpatient care when individuals are given Medicaid, as found by 
Finkelstein et al. (2012).24 
Column 3 shows that for all adults, these effects are larger for the second or third annual 
visit, whereas for single women the effects reach into larger numbers of annual visits. For 
overnight hospitalizations or ER visits, we obtain point estimates that are also mostly negative 
(columns 5–7) but not statistically significant at conventional levels. 25 As such we are unable to 
rule out large reductions in utilization for these types of care, but in some cases also cannot rule 
out small increases in utilization as well. If the reduction in the number of doctor visits is 
because of better case management, we might expect to see changes in hospital or ER utilization, 
similar to Seligman et al. (2014) and Cotti, Gordanier, and Ozturk (2018); however, ER and 
hospital visits are quite rare in the data relative to doctor visits, which may explain the 
imprecision of our results on these outcomes.26  
The estimates on two or more physician visits imply intent to treat effects of 44–45 
percent, which are quite large. However, there are several reasons to take caution when 
interpreting these estimates. First, the confidence intervals on the estimates are wide, which is 
not dissimilar to the large confidence intervals in other studies utilizing similar methods such as 
Borjas (2004) and Kaushal (2007). Additionally, we are cautious about interpreting the sample 
mean as the counterfactual incidence rate of two or more physician visits, because those who 
actually participate in food stamps are likely to be more disadvantaged than the full sample. For 
                                                 
24 Finkelstein et al. (2012) also find effects on utilization for Medicaid on the extensive margin. It is 
difficult to compare magnitudes, as the utilization variables in Finkelstein et al. (2012) are continuous and ours are 
categorical. 
25 It is important to note that “office visit” includes times seeing a doctor or health care professional at a 
doctor’s office, clinic, or other place and does not include ER visits, overnight hospitalizations, dental visits, or 
telephone calls. So, these outcomes are mutually exclusive. 
26 We have also examined whether the number of ER visits, conditional on any visits, is affected and find 
no evidence that it is. 
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example, 3.6 percent of treated immigrants who have income below the poverty line report being 
diagnosed with diabetes, relative to 2.3 percent for the nonpoor. Similarly, the rates of heart 
disease, hypertension, and overweight/obesity, as well as the incidence of heart attacks, are all 
much higher among the poor relative to the nonpoor sample.27 
Affordability 
To understand the reason for the change in the intensity of doctor visits, we examine 
several possible mechanisms. First, we test whether food stamps affected the affordability of 
general medical care or four types of specialty care (prescription medication, mental health care, 
dental care, eyeglasses). If food stamps increase family resources, allowing individuals to afford 
better care or specialty care—such as medication to better manage chronic conditions—this may 
reduce the need for doctor office visits. As shown in Table 4, there is no evidence that food 
stamps affect the likelihood of not receiving needed medical care because of cost (column 1). 
However, the summary index of affordability of specialty care indicates that, for single women, 
eligibility for food stamps reduces the likelihood they did not receive specialty care because of 
issues of cost (column 2). This is similar to the suggestive evidence for children found in 
Bronchetti, Christensen, and Hoynes (2017), who document that higher-value SNAP benefits 
reduce unaffordability of children’s health care. Looking across the columns, the effect on the 
summary index of affordability of specialty care appears to be driven primarily by a decline in 
the unaffordability of mental and dental care, although the estimates on all types of specialty care 
are negative.28 This suggests that one potential pathway for reduced doctor visits is through 
improved affordability of needed specialty care. It is important to note, however, that the 
                                                 
27 Authors’ calculations using the NHIS. 
28 Our measure of doctor visits does not include dental care. Therefore, we are unable to test if these 
individuals actually received more dental care because of food stamps. 
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affordability of mental care may be driven by changes in health, as well as changes in 
affordability, because the question refers to care that is “needed [but not received] because you 
couldn’t afford it.” Therefore, we next examine how food stamps directly affect mental and 
physical health outcomes that may be influenced by short-run changes in access to food stamps.  
Self-Reported Health 
Table 5 includes results for four summary variables of overall physical and mental health. 
Changes in these outcomes could explain the changes in the number of doctor visits or the 
unaffordability of mental care. The first column examines the categorical measure of self-
reported overall health, and the second column transforms this variable into a dummy variable to 
ease interpretation—this variable is equal to one if the individual reports being in “excellent” or 
“very good” health. Across both outcomes, we find no significant effect of food stamp eligibility 
on self-assessed health, and all point estimates actually suggest self-reported health is worsening, 
so this is unlikely to drive the result of decreased doctor visits. There is also no statistically 
significant effect on the likelihood of being overweight or obese in the short run, confirming the 
findings of Kaushal (2007). Finally, we find no significant effect on mental health, indicating 
that the change in affordability of mental health care found in the previous section (reported in 
Table 4) for single women is not due to a change in whether mental care is perceived to be 
needed. However, we note that many of these estimates are accompanied by large standard 
errors.  
Chronic Illness 
We next explore the possibility that food stamps decreased health care utilization by 
allowing existing patients to improve their management of chronic illnesses. This could be 
because of increased resources in general, or improved nutrition allowing for better regulation of 
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glycemic illnesses such as diabetes. To accomplish this, we once again estimate Equation (1) 
using a binary variable for multiple office visits in the past year as an outcome, as this was where 
we estimated the strongest response to food stamp eligibility among utilization outcomes. We 
then include in Equation (1) an additional interaction between the eligibility measure and a 
binary variable for whether the individual reports having ever been diagnosed with a chronic 
illness. If the coefficient on these interactions shows a strong response, this would be evidence of 
food stamp eligibility having an additional effect on utilization for individuals with those specific 
chronic illnesses. Specifically, we look at diabetes, hypertension, any reported chronic illness 
(heart disease, obesity, diabetes, or hypertension), and self-reported “poor” or “fair” health, 
which can be viewed as a catch-all that is likely correlated with chronic illness. Many of these 
measures are uncommon, and therefore we have few individuals in our sample who experience 
them.29 This suggests that these subsamples are unlikely to be driving our main results. 
The results from this analysis are reported in Table 6. None of the interaction coefficients 
are statistically significant at conventional levels, and the pattern of results is not consistent 
either across conditions or across the two demographic groups. These estimates suggest that 
reductions in the utilization of health care owing to food stamp eligibility were not attributable to 
better management of chronic conditions. 
To summarize, we find evidence that food stamp eligibility reduces the likelihood of two 
or more doctor visits in the past year, as well as needing specialty care but not receiving it 
because of cost for single women. We find no evidence that these changes in health care 
utilization and health care affordability are driven by changes in physical or mental health, or due 
to individuals with chronic conditions in particular needing less care. The increase in resources 
                                                 
29 We report the sample mean of each of these measures of poor health in Table 6.  
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from Food Stamp access allow single women to afford needed specialty medical care they 
previously were unable to. While we are unable to determine the exact mechanisms behind the 
effect on doctor visits, our results do suggest that a potential mechanism may be improved 
management of general health (as opposed to chronic conditions), due to increased resources, or 
improved nutrition.  
ROBUSTNESS AND SPECIFICATION CHECKS 
 The identifying assumption in the regression model is that there are no other changes 
occurring across states and over time that are correlated with the food stamp policy changes that 
also affect adult health care. One way to test the validity of this assumption is to implement a 
triple difference model with low-educated U.S.-born adults as a control group. To do this we 
estimate a model similar to Equation (1), but here we also include control/treatment status fixed 
effects (that indicate whether the individual is a “treated immigrant” or U.S.-born), as well as 
state by control/treatment status fixed effects, and year by control/treatment status fixed effects. 
We also interact the state by year controls, 𝑍𝑠𝑡, with whether the individual is in the 
control/treatment group to allow for differential effects of economic conditions and state policy 
on immigrants and natives. Finally, we include the same measure of treated immigrants 
eligibility 𝑇. 𝐼. 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑠𝑡 as in Equation (1), as well as this measure interacted with whether the 
individual is in the treatment group: 𝑇. 𝐼. 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖. 
 If the identifying assumption is correct, we expect the coefficient on treated immigrants’ 
eligibility to be close to zero, as this captures the effect of treated immigrants’ eligibility on 
natives’ outcomes. Additionally, the coefficient on the interaction term should be similar to our 
baseline estimates. In this, and all other robustness and specification checks, we focus on the 
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outcome of two or more doctor visits, as this was the most precisely estimated and consistent 
result. This result is shown in column 2 of Table 7 and confirms both of these predictions. The 
triple difference model also provides a falsification test in the first row of column 2—there is no 
effect of immigrant-specific food stamp eligibility on natives’ outcomes. Additionally, we can 
push this triple difference model even further by including state by year fixed effects, which 
flexibly absorb any common shocks to health care that affect both natives and treated 
immigrants. In this model, we drop the uninteracted measure of treated immigrants’ eligibility. 
These results are shown in the third column of Table 7 and provide similar estimates as the 
baseline model.30  
 The main limitation of the triple difference model is that natives may not be an ideal 
control group for treated immigrants. So, an alternative test of the identifying assumption is to 
directly include controls for other state by year policies and characteristics. We do this in 
columns 2–5 of Table 8. First, we include controls for adult Medicaid eligibility—specifically, 
the eligibility thresholds of adults and parents expressed as fraction of the federal poverty line—
and the results are nearly identical to the baseline.31 Accounting for other state safety net 
generosity (maximum TANF benefits, presence of a SCHIP program, or a state EITC), and state 
attitudes toward immigrants do not substantively change the results. The inclusion of state SNAP 
options—online application, broad-based categorical eligibility, time requirements for 
reeligibility certification, face-to-face interview and recertification requirements, fingerprint 
requirements, and vehicle exemptions—beyond those in the baseline model (EBT issuance and 
outreach spending) cause the coefficient for single women to no longer be statistically 
                                                 
30 These specification checks yield similar results when replicated for the other outcome variables in the 
results section. These are available on request. 
31 Further, explicit tests of food stamp eligibility on Medicaid enrollment show no effect (results available 
on request). 
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significantly different from zero. This is because of an increase in standard error as well as a 
slight decrease in the magnitude of the estimate, and the estimate is well within the confidence 
interval of the baseline result. The results remain similar for all adults. A final concern with the 
identifying assumption is that fill-in states may have had different trends in health care than no-
fill-in states, which may bias the results. To account for this, we include state linear time trends 
in column 6, and the results are similar to the baseline.  
 We also conduct several specification checks on the main results, shown in columns 7–9 
of Table 8. First, we drop all observations from California, as it is by far the largest fill-in state, 
and the results remain similar. Next, we include census region by year fixed effects to account 
for differences across regions and time in health care utilization. For example, these fixed effects 
will account for a large flu epidemic in the south in one year. This addition causes the standard 
errors to increase and the coefficients to shrink slightly, so the point estimates are no longer 
statistically different from zero; however, qualitatively the results are similar to the main 
estimates. Finally, we include calendar month by year fixed effects. The policy changes occur at 
the year and month level, so there is still identifying variation left after inclusion of these 
controls; however, this is a demanding specification. Nevertheless, the results remain similar.32  
 We next examine the effects on several different subgroups likely to be less affected by 
the policy changes than our primary group of interest. If the main results were driven by some 
unaccounted-for changes in health care occurring across states and over time, then the effect 
estimated with these placebo groups would be similar to our main results. First, we restrict the 
sample to immigrants who entered the United States more than 10 years, and more than 20 years 
                                                 
32 The results for single women’s affordability of specialty medical care and results for food stamp receipt 
and benefit amount are also qualitatively similar across all these robustness and specification checks. Results 
available on request.  
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before the survey. The longer immigrants have been in the United States, the less likely they will 
be affected by the food stamp eligibility changes, as they are more likely to either have become 
naturalized citizens, or to have earned 40 quarters of qualifying work in the United States. As 
expected, the effects are much smaller for these groups, shown in columns 2–3 of Table 9. For 
all adults, the effect falls to zero, and for single women the effect is still statistically significant 
but attenuated relative to the main results. However, these results should be interpreted with the 
caveat that there is measurement error in foreign-born individuals’ year of arrival to the United 
States. We also break down the samples into four disaggregate education groups: less than high 
school, high school, some college, and college or more. We expect there to be much smaller 
effects on the highly educated groups, as they participated in the food stamp program at much 
lower rates prior to welfare reform, and indeed this is what we find in columns 4–7.  
 As a final test of our identification strategy, we examine how food stamp eligibility is 
correlated with the observable characteristics of our sample that are not used in the construction 
of our eligibility measure. A consistent pattern of an observable characteristic predicted by 
eligibility could be seen as suggestive evidence that our results are driven by selective changes in 
the sample composition. Results from this analysis are shown in Table 10. There are no 
consistent patterns.  
CONCLUSION 
 This study provides quasi-experimental evidence about the effects of the food stamp 
program on adults’ contemporaneous health care utilization. We find a reduction in the number 
of office visits per year. We see little evidence of changes in self-reported physical or mental 
health that could explain these findings on doctor visits, and no evidence that this is driven by 
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individuals with common chronic illnesses. For single women, access to food stamps increases 
the affordability of specialty medical care, which may explain some of the effects we find on 
doctor visits for this subgroup. These results suggest that improved management of health care 
needs because of increased resources, or improved nutrition, may be part of the reason for the 
decrease in the number of doctor visits per year.  
 The reduction in physician visits represents an important channel through which 
providing food stamps may reduce health care expenditures. Importantly, roughly 44 percent of 
food stamp recipients in our population also received health insurance coverage through the 
Medicaid program,33 so this reduction in health care expenditure accrues to the government, as 
well as to the individuals receiving the benefits who pay out of pocket and to private insurers.34 
To gauge the magnitude of these savings, we take an estimate of the Colorado Medicaid payment 
for a 15-minute office visit: $64 in 2017 (Colorado Department of Health Care Policy and 
Financing 2017). This is the most commonly billed type of visit, and many visits include 
additional billable procedures (such as laboratory tests) not included in the office visit 
component of the bill, so we view this as a lower bound for expenditures. If we further assume 
that most individuals who reduce the intensive margin of doctor visits are moving from two 
doctor visits per year to one doctor visit per year, the point estimate in Table 1 indicates that 
providing food stamps reduces health care expenditures by $9 per person (0.144 × 64). This is a 
lower bound of 4 percent of total expenditures on food stamps per capita, indicating that a 
portion of government expenditures on food stamps may be recovered just through reductions in 
                                                 
33 Authors’ calculation using the Current Population Survey. Statistics calculated using the years 2004–
2007, when eligibility was restored to the population of interest. 
34 However, we also note that we do see suggestive evidence of increases in specialty health care utilization 
for single women, which may also be financed by Medicaid.  
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doctor visits for adults.35 However, this is conservative lower-bound, as office visits often 
contain other billed services, and as Medicaid payments are considerably less expensive than 
payments via Medicare or private insurance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 Expenditures on food stamps in 2014 were $74.1 billion (Hoynes and Schanzenbach 2015), and the total 
U.S. population in this year was 318.6 million. Converted in 2017 dollars, this is a cost of $243 per person. 
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APPENDIX 
We include controls for economic conditions and other safety net programs in our 
estimation models. Economic conditions are known to influence adult health and health behavior 
(see, for example, Ruhm [2000, 2005]), as do safety net programs (see, for example, Evans and 
Garthwaite [2014]). We merge on to the NHIS information about states’ unemployment rates, 
whether the state had an EITC or SCHIP program, maximum welfare benefits, other state food 
stamp policies, and income eligibility cutoffs for Medicaid and SCHIP for children by state. 
We obtain unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. EITC information 
comes from the NBER TAXSIM. Dates on maximum welfare benefits are from Robert Moffitt 
(available at http://www.econ2.jhu.edu/people/moffitt/datasets.html). Information on other food 
stamp program changes—the frequency with which applications must be recertified, whether in-
person applications or recertifications are required, state spending on outreach, broad-based 
categorical eligibility, vehicle asset rules, and whether benefits are issued on debit cards, are all 
obtained from the SNAP Policy Database. The SCHIP program start dates are obtained from 
Rosenbach et al. (2001) and the Medicaid/SCHIP generosity measures come from Hoynes and 
Luttmer (2011), which are supplemented with information from the National Governor’s 
Association. 
Local attitudes regarding immigration may affect immigrants’ program participation 
(Watson 2014), so we follow Bronchetti (2014) and include two measures of state attitudes: 1) 
the fraction of individuals reporting that they would like immigration decreased from the 
American National Election Studies (ANES), and 2) the number of deportation court cases per 
foreign-born individual from Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) Immigration 
Reports. The ANES only includes census region identifiers, so we assign the same values to all 
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states within the same region. Additionally, the ANES information is only available in even 
years, so we linearly interpolate in the missing years.  
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Figure 1  PRWORA Eligibility Timeline 
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Table 1  Demographic Summary Statistics—NHIS 
 All adults with high school 
education or less 
Single women with high school 
education or less 
Female 0.45 -- 
Year entered U.S. 1996 1995 
White 0.59 0.52 
Black 0.07 0.15 
Asian 0.04 0.04 
Hispanic 0.75 0.71 
Number of children 1.26 1.12 
Married 0.64 -- 
Less that high school 0.65 0.66 
Below poverty 0.15 0.33 
Age 33.6 33.2 
NOTE: The sample is all immigrants aged 18–59 who moved to the United States between 5 and 15 years before 
the survey year, and whose head of household has a high school education or less. Means weighted using the 
sample weights. 
SOURCE: 1998–2007 NHIS. 
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Table 2  Effect of Food Stamp Eligibility on Food Stamp Receipt 
 (1) 
Received food stamps last year 
(2) 
Benefit amount received 
   
 A: All adults with high school education or less 
Fraction of past year T.I. Eligible 
for food stamps 
0.044*** 
(0.013) 
85.750*** 
(39.828) 
   
Mean outcome variable 0.12 289.06 
N 11,674 11,674 
   
 B: Single women with high school education or less 
Fraction of past year T.I. Eligible 
for food stamps 
0.096*** 
(0.032) 
201.132*** 
(78.151) 
   
Mean outcome variable 0.24 611.17 
N 2,785 2,785 
NOTE: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The sample is all immigrants aged 18–59 who moved to the United 
States between 5 and 15 years before the survey year, and whose head of household has a high school education 
or less. All regressions included state and year fixed effects, as well as state by year controls for the 
unemployment rate, Medicaid/SCHIP generosity, and state SNAP program parameters. They also include the 
following demographic controls: gender, age, year of immigration, race/ethnicity, marital status, and educational 
attainment, as well as number of kids under 5, number of kids, number of kids born outside the United States, and 
the number of elderly living in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and all results 
weighted using the sample weights.  
  SOURCE: 1998–2007 CPS.
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Table 3  Effect of Food Stamp Eligibility on Health Care Utilization 
 (1) 
Any office 
visits 
(2) 
2+ office visits 
(3) 
4+ office 
visits 
(4) 
2+ office visits 
(conditional on any) 
(5) 
Any overnight 
hospitalization 
(6) 
Any ED visits 
(7) 
 
2+ ED visits 
 A: All adults with high school education or less 
Fraction of past year 
T.I. eligible for food 
stamps 
−0.022 
(0.058) 
−0.144*** 
(0.051) 
−0.048 
(0.057) 
−0.244*** 
(0.073) 
−0.015 
(0.017) 
−0.065 
(0.039) 
0.003 
(0.021) 
        
Mean outcome 
Variable 
0.492 0.320 0.162 0.651 0.074 0.165 0.004 
N 3,026 3,026 3,026 1,498 6,644 3,041 3,041 
        
 B: Single women with high school education or less 
Fraction of past year 
T.I. eligible for food 
stamps 
−0.142 
(0.108) 
−0.199*** 
(0.072) 
−0.125* 
(0.066) 
−0.192** 
(0.091) 
−0.017 
(0.045) 
−0.031 
(0.072) 
−0.009 
(0.032) 
        
Mean outcome 
Variable 
0.611 0.442 0.144 0.724 0.112 0.188 0.070 
N 764 764 764 478 1,218 770 770 
NOTE: * p<.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01. The sample is all immigrants aged 18–59 who moved to the United States between 5 and 15 years before the survey 
year, and whose head of household has a high school education or less. All regressions included state and year fixed effects, as well as state by year controls 
for the unemployment rate, Medicaid/SCHIP generosity, and state SNAP program parameters. They also include the following demographic controls: gender, 
age, year of immigration, race/ethnicity, marital status, and educational attainment, as well as number of kids under 5, number of kids, number of kids born 
outside the United States, and the number of elderly living in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and all results weighted using the 
sample weights.  
SOURCE: 1998–2007 NHIS. 
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Table 4  Effect of Food Stamp Eligibility on Health Care Affordability 
 In the past 12 months… 
 (1) 
Needed medical 
care but not 
received due to 
cost 
(2) 
Summary  
index of 
affordability of 
specialty care 
(3) 
Needed prescription 
medication but could 
not afford 
(4) 
Needed mental 
care but could 
not afford 
(5) 
Needed dental 
care but could 
not afford 
(6) 
Needed 
eyeglasses but 
could not afford 
 A: All adults with high school education or less 
Fraction of past year T.I. Eligible 
for food stamps 
0.009 
(0.026) 
−0.093 
(0.160) 
0.001 
(0.028) 
−0.024 
(0.021) 
−0.011 
(0.028) 
0.002 
(0.022) 
       
Mean outcome variable 0.097 0.038 0.067 0.017 0.099 0.037 
N 6,643 2,732 3,050 3,051 3,050 2,732 
  
 B: Single women with high school education or less 
Fraction of past year T.I. Eligible 
for food stamps 
0.026 
(0.054) 
−0.847* 
(0.442) 
−0.084 
(0.096) 
−0.098** 
(0.046) 
−0.149* 
(0.084) 
−0.147 
(0.091) 
       
Mean outcome variable 0.133 0.296 0.121 0.030 0.196 0.070 
N 1,218 681 771 771 771 681 
NOTE: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The sample is all immigrants aged 18–59 who moved to the United States between 5 and 15 years before the survey 
year, and whose head of household has a high school education or less. All regressions included state and year fixed effects, as well as state by year controls 
for the unemployment rate, Medicaid/SCHIP generosity, and state SNAP program parameters. They also include the following demographic controls: gender, 
age, year of immigration, race/ethnicity, marital status, and educational attainment, as well as number of kids under 5, number of kids, number of kids born 
outside the United States, and the number of elderly living in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and all results weighted using the 
sample weights.  
SOURCE: 1998–2007 NHIS. 
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Table 5  Effect of Food Stamp Eligibility on Physical and Mental Health 
 (1)  
 
Overall health 
(1=“excellent” … 
5=“poor”)  
(2) 
In “excellent” or 
“very good” 
health  
(binary) 
(3) 
 
Overweight or 
obese 
(binary) 
(4) 
 
Z-score 
summary index 
of mental health 
 A: All adults with high school education or less 
Fraction of past year T.I. 
eligible for food stamps 
0.064 
(0.066) 
−0.026 
(0.033) 
−0.081 
(0.051) 
0.020 
(0.060) 
     
Mean outcome variable 2.173 0.614 0.583 0.016 
N 6,649 6,649 2,883 3,017 
     
 B: Single women with high school education or less 
Fraction of past year T.I. 
eligible for food stamps 
0.207 
(0.129) 
−0.055 
(0.059) 
−0.018 
(0.117) 
0.220 
(0.207) 
     
Mean outcome Variable 2.311 0.556 0.503 −0.307 
N 1,218 1,218 727 761 
NOTE: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The sample is all immigrants aged 18–59 who moved to the United 
States between 5 and 15 years before the survey year, and whose head of household has a high school education 
or less. All regressions included state and year fixed effects, as well as state by year controls for the 
unemployment rate, Medicaid/SCHIP generosity, and state SNAP program parameters. They also include the 
following demographic controls: gender, age, year of immigration, race/ethnicity, marital status, and educational 
attainment, as well as number of kids under 5, number of kids, number of kids born outside the United States, and 
the number of elderly living in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and all results 
weighted using the sample weights.  
SOURCE: 1998–2007 NHIS. 
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Table 6  Effect of Food Stamp Eligibility on Health Care Utilization for Individuals with Chronic Illness 
  Interact eligibility with chronic condition 
 (1) 
 
 
Baseline 
(2) 
 
 
Diabetes 
(3) 
 
Hyper- 
tension 
(4) 
Heart disease, 
obesity, diabetes or 
hypertension 
(5) 
Self-reported 
“poor” or 
“fair” health 
Outcome: 2+ office visits in 
past year 
 
 A: All adults with high school education or less 
Fraction of past year T.I. 
Eligible for food stamps 
−0.144*** 
(0.051) 
−0.154*** 
(0.049) 
−0.131** 
(0.052) 
−0.130** 
(0.053) 
−0.153*** 
(0.054) 
      
Fraction of past year T.I. 
Eligible for food stamps × 
chronic condition 
 0.170 
(0.116) 
−0.059 
(0.076) 
−0.004 
(0.074) 
0.035 
(0.115) 
      
Mean of chronic measure  0.03 0.079 0.1 0.076 
N 
 
 3,013 3,021 3,026 3,026 
Outcome: 2+ office visits in 
past year 
     
 B: Single women with high school education or less 
Fraction of past year T.I. 
Eligible for food stamps 
−0.199*** 
(0.072) 
−0.186** 
(0.075) 
−0.213** 
(0.080) 
−0.201** 
(0.084) 
−0.206*** 
(0.073) 
      
Fraction of past year T.I. 
Eligible for food stamps × 
chronic condition 
 −0.156 
(0.159) 
0.126 
(0.196) 
0.035 
(0.177) 
0.046 
(0.095) 
      
Mean of chronic measure  0.04 0.101 0.123 0.104 
N  761 762 764 764 
NOTE: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The sample is all immigrants aged 18–59 who moved to the United 
States between 5 and 15 years before the survey year, and whose head of household has a high school education 
or less. All regressions included state and year fixed effects, as well as state by year controls for the 
unemployment rate, Medicaid/SCHIP generosity, and state SNAP program parameters. They also include the 
following demographic controls: gender, age, year of immigration, race/ethnicity, marital status, and educational 
attainment, as well as number of kids under 5, number of kids, number of kids born outside the United States, and 
the number of elderly living in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and all results 
weighted using the sample weights.  
SOURCE: 1998–2007 NHIS. 
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Table 7  Triple Difference Specification Check of the Effect of Eligibility on Health Care Utilization 
  Triple difference 
 (1) 
 
 
Baseline 
(2) 
Without state by 
year fixed effects 
(3) 
With state by 
year fixed 
effects 
Outcome: 2+ office visits in past year    
 A: All adults with high school education or less 
Fraction of past year T.I. eligible for food stamps  −0.005 
(0.010) 
 
    
Fraction of past year T.I. eligible for food stamps × 
treated immigrant 
−0.144*** 
(0.051) 
−0.135** 
(0.052) 
−0.137** 
(0.054) 
    
N 3,026 65,900 65,900 
 
Outcome: 2+ office visits in past year 
   
 B: Single women with high school education or less 
Fraction of past year T.I. eligible for food stamps  0.022 
(0.023) 
 
    
Fraction of past year T.I. eligible for food stamps × 
treated immigrant 
−0.199*** 
(0.072) 
−0.232*** 
(0.073) 
−0.237*** 
(0.075) 
    
N 764 19,951 19,951 
NOTE: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.0. The sample is all immigrants aged 18–59 who moved to the United 
States between 5 and 15 years before the survey year, and whose head of household has a high school education 
or less. In the triple difference specifications, the sample also includes all U.S.-born individuals aged 18–59 
whose head of household has a high school education or less. All regressions included state and year fixed effects, 
as well as state by year controls for the unemployment rate, Medicaid/SCHIP generosity, and state SNAP 
program parameters. They also include the following demographic controls: gender, age, year of immigration, 
race/ethnicity, marital status, and educational attainment, as well as number of kids under 5, number of kids, 
number of kids born outside the United States, and the number of elderly living in the household. Triple 
difference specifications in columns 2 and 3 also include state by immigrant status, and year by immigrant status 
fixed effects, as well as the state by year controls interacted with immigrant status. Standard errors are clustered at 
the state level and all results weighted using the sample weights.  
SOURCE: 1998–2007 NHIS. 
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Table 8  Robustness and Specification Checks of Effects of Eligibility on Two or More Doctor Visits 
   State by year controls Specification checks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  
 
 
Baseline 
 
 
Adult 
Medicaid 
generosity 
  
Other safety 
net program 
generosity 
 
Attitudes 
towards 
immigrants 
 
 
Other sate 
SNAP 
options 
 
 
State linear 
time trends 
 
 
Drop 
California 
Include 
census 
region by 
year fixed 
effects 
Include year 
by calendar 
month fixed 
effects 
 Outcome: 2+ office visits in past year       
  A: All adults with high school education or less 
Fraction of past year 
T.I. eligible for food 
stamps 
−0.144*** 
(0.051) 
−0.146*** 
(0.051) 
−0.155*** 
(0.057) 
−0.159*** 
(0.057) 
−0.142** 
(0.061) 
−0.219** 
(0.082) 
−0.160* 
(0.086) 
−0.107 
(0.069) 
−0.130*** 
(0.044) 
          
N 3,026 3,026 3,026 3,026 3,026 3,026 2,259 3,026 3,026 
 
Outcome: 2+ office 
visits in past year  
         
  B: Single women with high school education or less 
Fraction of past year 
T.I. eligible for food 
stamps 
−0.199*** 
(0.072) 
−0.214*** 
(0.075) 
−0.207** 
(0.083) 
−0.265*** 
(0.085) 
−0.137 
(0.137) 
−0.331*** 
(0.113) 
−0.192 
(0.117) 
−0.128 
(0.100) 
−0.202** 
(0.089) 
          
N 764 764 764 764 764 764 575 764 764 
NOTE: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The sample is all immigrants aged 18–59 who moved to the United States between 5 and 15 years before the survey 
year, and whose head of household has a high school education or less. All regressions included state and year fixed effects, as well as state by year controls 
for the unemployment rate, Medicaid/SCHIP generosity, and state SNAP program parameters. They also include the following demographic controls: gender, 
age, year of immigration, race/ethnicity, marital status, and educational attainment, as well as number of kids under 5, number of kids, number of kids born 
outside the United States, and the number of elderly living in the household. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and all results weighted using the 
sample weights.  
SOURCE: 1998–2007 NHIS.  
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Table 9  Subgroup Analysis of the Effects of Eligibility on Two or More Office Visits 
  Year of entry Education 
 (1) 
Baseline 
(high school 
or less)  
(2) 
Entered U.S. 
>10 years 
before survey 
(3) 
Entered U.S. 
>20 years 
before survey 
(4) 
Head less than 
high school 
(5) 
 
Head high 
school only 
(6) 
 
Head some 
college 
(7) 
 
Head college of 
more 
Outcome: 2+ office visits in past year      
 A: All adults 
Fraction of Past Year T.I. 
Eligible for Food Stamps 
−0.144*** 
(0.051) 
−0.001 
(0.025) 
−0.031 
(0.027) 
−0.144* 
(0.075) 
−0.103 
(0.096) 
0.176* 
(0.095) 
0.041 
(0.066) 
        
N 3,026 20,202 10,324 2,115 932 762 1,144 
        
Outcome: 2+ office visits in 
past year 
       
 B: Single women 
Fraction of Past Year T.I. 
Eligible for Food Stamps 
−0.199*** 
(0.072) 
−0.107** 
(0.037) 
−0.118*** 
(0.046) 
−0.192** 
(0.094) 
−0.207 
(0.202) 
−0.195 
(0.187) 
−0.072 
(0.236) 
        
N 764 4,805 2,619 534 242 261 225 
NOTE: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Baseline sample is all immigrants whose head of household has a high school education or less and who moved to 
the US between 5 and 15 years before the survey year. The sample in columns 2–3 is the same as the baseline sample, except it conditions on different year of 
entry cutoffs as listed. The samples in columns 4–7 are the same as the baseline sample except they condition on different educational attainment cutoffs as 
listed. All regressions included state and year fixed effects, as well as state by year controls for the unemployment rate, Medicaid/SCHIP generosity, and state 
SNAP program parameters. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and all results weighted using the sample weights.  
SOURCE: 1998–2007 NHIS. 
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Table 10  Correlation of Eligibility with Observable Characteristics 
 All adults with high school education or less Single women with high school education or less 
 Person file Sample adult file Person file Sample adult file 
Outcome: Female     
T.I. Eligible for Food Stamps −0.003 0.066 −− −− 
  (0.017) (0.042) −− −− 
     
Outcome: White     
T.I. Eligible for Food Stamps 0.059 0.037 0.045 0.140** 
  (0.056) (0.059) (0.074) (0.063) 
Outcome: Black     
T.I. Eligible for Food Stamps 0.005 −0.011 0.002 −0.041 
  (0.028) (0.037) (0.089) (0.097) 
Outcome: Asian     
T.I. Eligible for Food Stamps −0.016 −0.001 0.003 −0.003 
  (0.021) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) 
Outcome: Hispanic     
T.I. Eligible for Food Stamps −0.010 0.005 −0.090 −0.117 
  (0.037) (0.041) (0.106) (0.105) 
Outcome: Number of Kids     
T.I. Eligible for Food Stamps −0.103 −0.150 −0.133 0.133 
  (0.128) (0.140) (0.191) (0.307) 
Outcome: Married     
T.I. Eligible for Food Stamps −0.019 −0.069 −− −− 
  (0.043) (0.064) −− −− 
Outcome: Less than HS     
T.I. Eligible for Food Stamps 0.009 −0.037 −0.031 −0.066 
  (0.034) (0.040) (0.073) (0.139) 
Outcome: Age      
T.I. Eligible for Food Stamps −1.300** −1.431 −0.944 −0.269 
 (0.639) (0.859) (1.453) (1.744) 
NOTE: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The sample is all immigrants aged 18–59 who moved to the United States between 5 and 15 years before the survey 
year, and whose head of household has a high school education or less. All regressions included state and year fixed effects, as well as state by year controls for 
the unemployment rate, Medicaid/SCHIP generosity, and state SNAP program parameters. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and all results weighted 
using the sample weights.  
SOURCE: 1998–2007 NHIS. 
